mandated that annual reports be created documenting the use of these surveillance powers. These reports are intended to enable policy makers as well as the general public to determine the extent to which such surveillance methods are used, and in the words of Senator Patrick Leahy, provide a "far more reliable basis than anecdotal evidence on which to assess law enforcement needs and make sensible policy in this area." 5 The existing surveillance statistics might be sufficient if law enforcement agencies' surveillance activities were limited to wiretaps and pen registers. However, over the last decade, law enforcement agencies have enthusiastically embraced many new sources of investigative and surveillance data for which there are no mandatory reporting requirements. As a result, most modern surveillance now takes place entirely off the books and the true scale of such activities, which vastly outnumber traditional wiretaps and pen registers, remains unknown. 6 This article will proceed as follows. Section II examines the existing electronic surveillance reporting requirements and the reports that have been created as a result. Some of these have been released to public, but many have only come to light as a result of Freedom of Information Act requests or leaks by government insiders. Section III examines several law enforcement surveillance methods for which there are no existing legally mandated surveillance reports. Finally, section IV proposes specific legislative reporting requirements in order to enable some reasonable degree of oversight and transparency over all forms of law enforcement electronic surveillance. 
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Section II: Surveillance methods for which there are official reports
Although law enforcement agencies have many electronic surveillance powers, official reports only exist for a few types, primarily those that relate to the real-time interception of data. This section will explore each of these law enforcement surveillance powers and examine specific trends detailed in the reports.
Electronic intercepts ("wiretaps")
In 1968, after a series of high-profile Supreme Court decisions, 7 Congress established federal rules governing the use of real-time electronic intercepts ("wiretaps"). 8 This law, the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, also required the Administrative Office of the US Courts to compile and submit to Congress detailed annual reports on the use of wiretaps and other forms of electronic surveillance by law enforcement agencies. 9 The legislative history states that:
[The wiretap reports] are intended to form the basis for a public evaluation of its operation. The reports are not intended to include confidential material. They should be statistical in character… [they] will assure the community that the system of court-order electronic surveillance envisioned by the proposed chapter is properly administered and will provide a basis for evaluating its operation. The reports are extremely detailed, and for each wiretap, reveals the city or county, the kind of interception (phone, computer, pager, fax), the number of individuals whose communications were intercepted, the number of intercepted messages, the number of arrests and convictions that resulted from the interception, as well as the financial cost of the wiretap.
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By all indications, the Administrative Office of the US Courts has done a good job in making sure that the reports are accurate and submitted to Congress in a timely manner, and has even drawn praise from Congress for doing so. 12 Since at least 1998, the Administrative Office has also made copies of these reports available to the general public via its website. 13 As such, the release of the annual report usually leads to media coverage regarding the increased use of wiretaps.
14

Analysis of existing reports
The Administrative Office of the Courts has published reports for the years 1997 to the present. 15 By comparing these reports, several interesting trends can be seen regarding the use of this surveillance power by federal and state law enforcement agencies. 
Wiretap requests are increasing, but rarely rejected by the courts
Wiretaps primarily target mobile phones
Over the past decade, the number of wiretaps involving fixed locations (such as homes or businesses) has declined in favor of intercepts of mobile phones. For example, 96 percent (2,276 wiretaps) of all authorized wiretap for 2009 are for portable devices. 19 As described earlier, the number of wiretaps has gone up each year over the past few decades. However, the statistics suggest that this increase is entirely due to increases in the number of mobile devices monitored.
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There are several factors that may explain this trend. First, our society has increasingly "cut the cord" and embraced mobile phones. 21 It is understandable that law enforcement agencies have followed their targets to this new technology. This trend is even stronger among young people and the poor, both of whom are generally more likely to be subject to investigation by the government. Second, it is far easier to wiretap mobile devices. Such intercepts can be performed from the comfort of a desk, rather than requiring that a phone company employee visit a remote office or exchange in order to intercept the line. The reason for this difference is that a majority of traditional wire-line telephone switches do not support modern interception technologies, in contrast to wireless switches, all of which support such interception capabilities.
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Roving authority is rarely used
Law enforcement agencies can obtain special "roving" intercept orders if they can demonstrate probable cause to believe that the target is actively thwarting interception at a specific location, 23 such as by using and abandoning low-cost mobile phones ("burners"). 24 Although government officials often 20 In 1997, the first year that reports are available on the web, there were 382 residential wiretaps, 78 at places of business, 185 combination orders (for multiple locations), and 529 "other" (which presumably included early mobile devices 
Surveillance and the war on drugs
The reports reveal one of the lesser known side effects of the war on drugs: the expansion of the surveillance state. The latest report reveals that more than 86 percent of the 2306 wiretap orders obtained by federal and state law enforcement agencies were sought in narcotics investigations. 26 The next largest categories are homicide/assault, "other" and racketeering, which were each specified in 4 percent, 3 percent and 3 percent, respectively, of applications. Earlier reports over the last decade confirm similar percentages.
These numbers are not too surprising, given that the earliest wiretapping cases involved government efforts to investigate bootleggers. 27 While the particular drug has changed, law enforcement surveillance resources still seem almost entirely dedicated to enforcing prohibitions.
5, 2011)("Last fall, during a narcotics raid on an apartment in Astoria, the authorities found 22 prepaid cellphones, and plenty of cash to pay for them: $133,000. Among the names people in New York City have used when buying prepaid cellphones are Lady Gaga, King Kong, Sugar Love and Jesus Mom, according to investigators with the Office of the Special Narcotics Prosecutor.")
Wiretaps of computers and email
The wiretap reports include specific categories describing the location and type of intercept order. One such category is "computer or email (electronic)," which refers to those orders used to intercept data in transit to a computer. The reports reveal that since 1997, federal law enforcement agencies have obtained just 67 such intercept orders and 54 have been issued to the state law enforcement agencies.
Based upon these numbers, it seems pretty clear that law enforcement agencies rarely engage in realtime interception of Internet communications, even as they continue to increase their use of mobile telephone surveillance. At first blush, this seems rather counterintuitive, given the degree to which our society has become dependent upon email, instant messages, social networks and other Internet based communications. However, there are many ways for law enforcement agencies to monitor internet communications, 28 and it is often easier and cheaper to do it after the fact rather than in real-time. 29 As I will explain later in this article, there are no official statistics regarding law enforcement acquisition of stored communications data.
Incidents of cryptography encountered in criminal investigations
During the late 90s, senior law enforcement officials repeatedly complained to Congress that they were "going dark" and losing the ability to intercept communications as criminals embraced encryption technologies. 30 Responding to these claims and a report from the U.S. Working Group on Organized
Crime, 31 Congress amended the existing wiretap reporting statute in 2000 to include statistics on the number of intercept orders in which encryption was encountered and whether such encryption prevented law enforcement from obtaining the plain text of communications. 32 These encryption reports, Senator Leahy argued at the time, would be "a far more reliable basis than anecdotal evidence on which to assess law enforcement needs and make sensible policy in this area."
According to these reports, during the last decade, there have been a total of 91 instances in which encryption was encountered during a federal or state wiretap, and not a single instance in which the encryption prevented law enforcement officials from obtaining the plain text of communications intercepted. Furthermore, over the past 4 years, the number of instances in which encryption was encountered has plunged to less than 2 cases per year. 33 These numbers strongly contradict the earlier claims by law enforcement officials regarding the impact of encryption technology. 34 This does not mean that individuals investigated by law enforcement agencies are not using encryption. The reporting requirements only document instances in which encryption is encountered during intercept orders, not, for example, during the search of a suspect's home. As explained later in this article, law enforcement agencies conduct very few intercepts of computers or Internet traffic, and so it is not too surprising that they rarely encountering encryption. In 2010, as part of a new push for surveillance powers including encryption backdoors, 35 The FBI told one privacy advocate that the previously published encryption statistics were "mistaken." He was also told that that a forthcoming report would confirm that encryption remains a problem for law enforcement agencies.
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The number of wiretaps is increasing, primarily among state law enforcement agencies
Over the last decade, the use of electronic surveillance orders has increased nationwide, although this is largely due to a massive increase in use by the states. Non-content intercepts ("pen registers" and "trap and trace devices")
Pen register and trap and trace devices are used by law enforcement agencies to obtain non-content communications records in real-time, such as phone numbers dialed, "to" and "from" information associated with email messages and the IP addresses of computers to which a suspect connects. With the Passage of the Pen Register Act in 1986, Congress required that annual statistical reports on the use of this surveillance method be compiled and submitted by the Attorney General . 38 These reporting requirements were subsequently expanded in 2000. 39 Describing his reasons for proposing the bill that successfully expanded the reporting requirements, Senator Leahy stated that:
"As the original sponsor of ECPA, I believed that adequate oversight of the surveillance activities of federal law enforcement could only be accomplished with reporting requirements such as the one included in this law."
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It is unclear from the legislative history why Congress opted to give the Attorney General the responsibility for compiling these reports and not the Administrative Office of the US Courts, which after two decades of reliably producing the wiretap reports, would have been the obvious choice to produce similar reports for pen register and trap and trace surveillance. It is also unclear why Congress opted to limit the reports to law enforcement agencies within the Department of Justice. As a result of this decision, the reports do not detail surveillance conducted other federal law enforcement agencies, such as the Secret Service or by state and local law enforcement agencies. 39 The expanded reports must include (1) The period of interceptions authorized by each order; (2) the number and duration of any extensions of the order; (3) the offense specified in the order or application or extension of the order; (4) the number of investigations involved; (5) the number and nature of the facilities affected; and (6) the identity, including district, of the applying investigative or law enforcement agency making the application and the person authorizing the order. 
Analysis of existing reports
As these reports do not include data on the use of non-content intercepts by state or federal law enforcement agencies outside the Department of Justice, it is impossible to determine their true scale.
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Even with these significant flaws, the Pen Register Act reports do reveal some interesting information, such as the massive growth in the use of these surveillance orders.
In 1987, the first year for which data exists, there were 1682 pen register and 97 trap and trace orders obtained by agencies within the Department of Justice. 52 Eleven years later, the number of pen registers nearly tripled to 4886, and the number of trap and traces increased nearly 25 times to 2437. In 1999, the reports started to provide numbers for specific federal agencies, and revealed , for example, that the FBI and DEA were each responsible for approximately half of the 4949 pen registers obtained that year, while the FBI alone was responsible for more than 84 percent of the 1553 trap and traces obtained. Like the DEA, the US Marshals Service also appears to request a single order for each person monitored (at least for the years 2001-2009). However, the statistics also reveal that the agency obtains identical numbers of pen registers and trap and trace orders. Since the legal process required to obtain a pen register is the same as a trap and trace, this suggests that the "boilerplate" language used by the Marshals requests both as a matter of standard policy. 
Emergency voluntary disclosures
When Congress passed the Electronic Communications Privacy Act in 1986, it permitted law enforcement agencies to obtain stored communications and customer records in emergencies without the need for a court order.
In such scenarios, a carrier can (but is not required to) disclose the requested information if it, "in good faith, believes that an emergency involving danger of death or serious physical injury to any person requires disclosure without delay of communications relating to the emergency." 59 Typically, belief means that a police officer states that an emergency exists.
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With the passage of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Congress created specific statistical reporting requirements for the voluntary disclosure of the contents of subscriber communications in emergency situations. In describing his motivation for introducing the requirement, Senator Lungren stated that:
"I felt that some accountability is necessary to ensure that this authority is not being abused… This information [contained in the reports] I believe should be highly beneficial to the Committee, fulfilling our oversight responsibility in the future … this is the best way for us to have a ready manner of looking at this particular section. In the hearings that we had, I found no (2002)), available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/s1001r.pdf ("The legislative history of a similar amendment to Section 2702(b)'s emergency voluntary disclosure provision for content information suggests that the belief standard was relaxed because communications service providers 'expressed concern to the Committee that the [reasonably believes] standard was too difficult for them to meet, and that as a result, providers may not disclose information relating to emergencies.'").
basis for claiming that there has been abuse of this section. I don't believe on its face it is an abusive section. But I do believe that it could be subject to abuse in the future and, therefore, this allows us as Members of Congress to have an ability to track this on a regular basis."
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As with the Pen Register Act reports, the emergency request reports are compiled and submitted by the Attorney General, and only apply to disclosures made to law enforcement agencies within the Department of Justice. As such, there are no statistics for emergency disclosures made to other federal law enforcement agencies, such as the Secret Service, as well as those made to state and local law enforcement agencies.
Furthermore, although 18 USC 2702 permits both the disclosure of the content of communications, as well as non-content records associated with subscribers and their communications, Congress only required that statistics be compiled for the disclosure of communications content. It is not clear why Congress limited the reports in this way.
Analysis of existing reports
Because the reporting requirements do not apply to disclosures made to law enforcement agencies outside the Department of Justice, and do not include the disclosure of non-content communications data and other subscriber records, the reports reveal a very limited portion of the scale of voluntary disclosures to law enforcement agencies.
Furthermore, although Congress intended for these reports to assist with public oversight of the emergency disclosure authority, the Department of Justice has not proactively made these reports available to the general public. In spite of this lack of transparency by DOJ, three years of reports have been obtained by privacy advocates, and placed online. http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/cpquery/2?&sid=cp109EDBl7&refer=&r_n=hr174p1.109&db_id=109&item=2&&sid=cp109EDBl7&r_n=hr17 4p1.109&dbname=cp109&hd_count=2&item=2&&sel=TOC_247686& ("To address concerns that [the voluntary emergency disclosure] authority, in certain circumstances, is not subject to adequate congressional, judicial or public oversight … The Committee believes this would strengthen oversight on the use of this authority without undermining important law enforcement prerogatives, and without tipping off perpetrators while simultaneously preserving the vitality of this life saving authority.")
A letter submitted by Verizon to Congressional committees in 2007 revealed that the company had received 25,000 emergency requests during the previous year. 63 Of these 25,000 emergency requests, just 300 requests were from the federal law enforcement agencies. In contrast, the reports submitted to Congress by the Attorney General reveal less than 20 disclosures per year. 64 Even though no other service provider has disclosed similar numbers regarding emergency disclosures, it is quite clear that the Department of Justice statistics are not adequately reporting the scale of this form of surveillance. In fact, they underreport these disclosures by several orders of magnitude.
Section III: Unreported surveillance methods
The previous section analyzed the use of electronic surveillance as documented in official government reports. There are several other forms of electronic surveillance for which no official reports exist. As such, the little available data largely comes from the companies themselves. Unfortunately, many companies, particularly those with the close ties to the government, will not discuss their disclosure of user data to law enforcement agencies. The reason for this widespread secrecy appears to be a fear that such information may scare users and give them reason to fear that their private information is not safe.
Requests to service providers for stored communications and subscriber records
The Stored Communications Act enables law enforcement agencies to obtain stored communications and subscriber records. This includes stored emails, instant messages, web browsing history, search engine records as well as documents stored "in the cloud." There no official statistics regarding such requests, although based on publicly available information, they likely number in the tens of thousands per year.
AOL was the first company to voluntarily disclose statistics, revealing to the New York Times in 2006 that it received 1000 requests per month. 66 In 2009, a representative from Facebook told Newsweek that it was receiving between ten to twenty requests from police per day. 67 In response to a copyright lawsuit in 2010, Time Warner revealed that it received approximately 500 IP address lookup requests for associated with its cable customers on average per month, nearly all of which came from law enforcement.
In April 2010, Google started publishing statistics regarding the number of requests for user data the company receives from governments around the world. According to those reports, the company received 4287 requests for user data between January 2010 to June 2010, and 3580 requests between July 2009 and December 2009. The company has not broken down these numbers into the various types of requests it receives.
68 66 Hansel, supra note FIXME ("AOL, for example, has more than a dozen people, including several former prosecutors, handling the nearly 1,000 requests it receives each month for information in criminal and civil cases. . . . AOL says that only 30 of the 1,000 monthly requests it receives are for civil cases, and that it initially rejects about 90 percent of those, arguing that they are overly broad or that the litigants lack proper jurisdiction. About half of those rejected are resubmitted, on narrower grounds."). , and now has more than 600 million. As such, it is probably reasonable to assume that it probably now receives many more requests.
68 http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/faq/#removalrequests ("The number of requests we receive for user account information as part of criminal investigations has increased year after year. The increase isn't surprising, since each year we offer more products and services, and we have a larger number of users … At a time when increasing numbers of governments are trying to regulate the free flow of information on the Internet, we hope this tool will shine some light on the scale and scope of government requests to … obtain user data around the globe -and we welcome external debates about these issues that we grapple with internally on a daily basis.")
In 2010, Congress held several hearings to examine the 20 year-old Electronic Communications Privacy Act. Republican Senators dismissed entirely the pleas of both companies and privacy advocates to protect communications content stored "in the cloud," by arguing, anecdotally, that the vast majority of requests for stored content are for child pornography investigations. 69 These claims were stated in a minority staff report, by an anonymous former federal prosecutor, citing his own experience at the Department of Justice. Because no official statistics exist, there is no way to verify this claim. However, it is worth noting that the majority use of most other forms of surveillance is to investigate drugs, not child pornography. 69 Memorandum to the SJC Minority Staff, The Electronic Communications Privacy Act: Promoting Security and Protecting Privacy in the Digital Age, Sept 17, 2010 at page 8 ("As noted above, anecdotally, a substantial majority of ECPA orders are used in child exploitation cases, meaning that the primary direct beneficiary of the changes proposed by Digital Due Process will be this class of offenders. In these cases, prosecutors are not usually interested in the content of communications; they are interested in quickly locating offenders in order to apprehend them to protect children.") available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/38407733/RepublicanSenate-memo-against-privacy-and-cloud-computing-reform
In 2000, the Republican controlled House of Representatives considered legislation that would set clear standards governing requests for location data. The same bill included a requirement that statistical reports be created for location data and requests to internet service providers. The Department of Justice opposed the bill, stating that the additional reporting requirements would consume scarce resources and "threaten[ed] to turn crime-fighters into bookkeepers." 75 Ultimately, the bill did not make it out of committee.
A decade later, when the House again looked into the topic of government requests for location data, there were still no statistics related to this technique. Because it didn't pass any legislation mandating reporting of such requests, Congress in 2010 knew just as little as it did in 2000.
which allow tracking of incoming and outgoing calls from a phone subject to much less stringent evidentiary standards-to gather location data."). .000/hju67343_0f.htm ("the imposition of such extensive reporting requirements for cyber-crime investigators would come at a time when law enforcement authorities are strapped for resources to fight cyber-crime. The reporting requirements for wiretaps, while extensive, are less onerous because law enforcement applies for such orders relatively rarely. Extending such requirements to orders used to obtain mere transactional data would dramatically hinder efforts to fight cybercrime, such as the distribution of child pornography and Internet fraud.")
Section IV: Closing the surveillance reporting gap
Even without complete statistics, it is quite clear that many law enforcement agencies have enthusiastically embraced surveillance of stored communications and transactional records. While wiretaps, the "most carefully regulated and reported-on area of telecommunications surveillance" 76 are used just a few thousand times per year, law enforcement agencies now make tens (if not hundreds) of thousands of requests per year for subscriber records, stored communications and location data. Unfortunately, Congress lacks any statistical data regarding many of these requests, and so is largely unable to perform effective oversight over this surveillance power.
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In 2008, Professor Paul Schwartz suggested that Congress create an annual telecommunications surveillance index (a surveillance "report card"), instead of the "bits and pieces of scattered reports" released each year. 78 That suggestion remains a valid and useful one, but even if Congress does not create a single resource for surveillance statistics, there are several ways in which it can significantly enhance its own and the general public's awareness of modern electronic surveillance.
First, the Pen Register Act should be amended so reporting under it is made to the Administrative Office of the courts, rather than the Department of Justice. Since judges have to approve pen register orders, it should be simple enough for clerks to send this information to the Administrative Office, just as they already do for wiretap orders. The Pen Register Act should also be amended so that the reporting requirements apply to all law enforcement agencies, and not just those federal agencies within the Department of Justice. For example, if the Secret Service or Los Angeles Police Department obtains a pen register order, it should be reported.
Second, the emergency disclosure reports, like the Pen Register Act reports, should be expanded to include disclosures made to all law enforcement agencies, and not just those federal agencies within the Department of Justice. These reports should be sent directly to the Administrative Office of the Courts, which can then compile them and send them onto Congress as part of a broader surveillance report. The emergency disclosure reports should also be broadened to include emergency disclosures of noncontent data and customer records. subpoena, additional reports will be necessary. Rather than requiring every law enforcement agency in the country to send reports to the Administrative Office, I propose that Internet Service Providers should be required to create and submit annual reports to the Administrative Office, which can then strip out the providers' identifying information, and compile reports that summarize the provider data.
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Fourth, Congress should create specific reporting requirements regarding the collection of historical and prospective location information, detailing the number of requests, the type of information requested, and the number of individuals whose information was obtained.
These reporting requirements would provide Congress with the information necessary to make sound policy in the area of electronic surveillance, yet because most of the responsibility for actually creating and compiling the reports falls upon the courts and the companies themselves, law enforcement agencies would not be able to complain, as they did in 2000, that the requirements would overburden them.
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In December 2010, a staffer working for the House Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties circulated a draft discussion bill that included all four of these recommendations. Unfortunately, that bill was never formally introduced.
Section V: Conclusion
Law enforcement agencies have had the ability to covertly monitor the communications of Americans for nearly a century. In order to perform effective oversight over these powers, Congress required the creation of surveillance reports that document the use of wiretaps and later pen registers. However, as Americans have increasingly embraced modern technologies such as mobile phones and the Internet, law enforcement agencies have followed. Unfortunately, there are no reporting requirements for the modern surveillance methods that make up the majority of law enforcement requests to service providers and telephone companies. As such, this surveillance largely occurs off the books, with no way for Congress or the general public to know the true scale of such activities. 79 It would be wise to include some de minimis rule, so that small providers that do not receive large numbers of requests would not be burdened with this requirement. Furthermore, since providers will incur costs associated with creating and submitting these reports, I suggest that they be permitted to seek reasonable compensation from the Administrative Office for doing so. http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju67343.000/hju67343_0f.htm (The reporting requirements "create a significant burden for law enforcement authorities…. The imposition of such extensive reporting requirements for cybercrime investigators at a time when law enforcement authorities are strapped for resources to fight cybercrime would hinder our efforts to fight cybercrime.")
In writing this article, I have tried to collect all publicly available information (as well as some not previously available) in order to present as complete a picture as possible regarding the current state of electronic surveillance. Even so, Congress should not have to rely on the work of a graduate student in order to keep tabs on this increasingly important issue. As demonstrated by the few pages of information presented in Section III, very little is known about the true scale of requests for stored communications or location data, although they likely number in the tens or hundreds of thousands per year.
In 2000, Congress considered legislation that would have significantly enhanced the surveillance reporting requirements. It failed to pass that bill. This year, Congress is again considering updating the aging Electronic Communications Privacy Act in order to better protect location data as well as data stored in the cloud. Unfortunately, Congress lacks independent, high-quality data upon which to evaluate law enforcement use of its existing surveillance powers.
If Congress punts on comprehensive privacy reform, as it has done so several times in the past, I hope that it at least mandates the creation of new surveillance statistics. Doing so will ensure that a future Congress will at least be equipped with useful data.
